Discrecionalidad Judicial
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2017-09-28
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Jaén: Universidad de Jaén
Resumen
[ES]A día de hoy, es innegable que el juez goza de una indudable y necesaria discrecionalidad, como consecuencia, entre otros factores, del creciente recurso a los Principios Jurídicos en el constitucionalismo contemporáneo. No obstante, si bien es cierto que esta discrecionalidad es inevitable, también lo es que debe de algún modo ser fiscalizada para impedir que derive en arbitrariedad y suponga una amenaza para los principios de igualdad y de seguridad jurídica.
Si bien antiguamente se consideró al juez como un mero aplicador del Derecho, quien se limitaba a reproducir las palabras de la ley, a día de hoy esta perspectiva no es mayoritariamente compartida, pues en una sociedad tan compleja como la nuestra son numerosos los casos en que el intérprete se ve obligado a suplir las lagunas jurídicas que puedan darse, bien por la vaguedad con que está redactada la norma aplicable, bien por no estar claro cuál de entre dos o más normas debe ser aplicada.
Esto provoca la consecuencia de que sea el juez el encargado de encontrar la respuesta correcta, o bien, encontrar una respuesta justa que tenga en cuenta la norma que debe ser ponderada, supliendo las lagunas que la misma pueda provocar.
La posibilidad de que para cada caso exista una respuesta correcta, ha sido uno de los temas que más debate ha provocado entre los juristas, pues al acudir a la discrecionalidad, se podría entender que da lugar a varias decisiones distintas aplicables a un mismo caso dependiendo del intérprete encargado de proveer una respuesta, en cuyo caso habría que determinar para empezar si es posible que exista más de una respuesta correcta para un mismo caso.
Para obtener una respuesta que, aunque discrecional, esté basada en Derecho, el intérprete debe acudir a los Principios Jurídicos, que serán las normas encargadas de dotar al Ordenamiento de completitud. Sin embargo, debido al gran grado de generalidad de los Principios, será una tarea ardua ponderar cuál de ellos debe ser aplicado, al igual que en multitud de casos más de un Principio podrán ser invocados, en cuyo caso el intérprete tendrá la labor de determinar el Principio que debe prevalecer sobre los demás para el caso determinado.
Para garantizar esta seguridad jurídica, y evitar la arbitrariedad, será necesario establecer límites a la discrecionalidad del intérprete. Estos límites se concretan más adelante, y si bien sirven para defender la seguridad jurídica, no pueden evitar que el juez haciendo uso de esta discrecionalidad cree Derecho, hecho que ha sido criticado por numerosos autores, pues supone una quiebra de la separación de poderes al permitir la creación de normas al poder judicial por medio de la interpretación.
Es por ello que estos límites actúan, impidiendo que la decisión adoptada pueda menoscabar cualquiera de los derechos de los particulares, obligando al juez a justificar su decisión así como a señalar el ajuste de la misma a Derecho.
[EN]To today, it is undeniable that the judge enjoys of an undoubted and necessary discretional nature, as a result, between other factors, of the increasing resource to the Juridical Beginning in the contemporary constitutionalism. Nevertheless, although it is true that this discretional nature is inevitable, also the fact it is that it has to be controlled somehow to prevent from deriving in arbitrariness and supposing a threat by the beginning of equality and of juridical safety. Although formerly the judge was considered to be a mere applicator of the Right, who was limiting himself to reproducing the words of the law, to today this perspective is not shared for the most part, so in a society as complex as ours there are numerous the cases in which the interpreter turns out to be forced to fulfill the juridical lagoons that could happen, well for the ambiguity with which the applicable norm is written, well for not being clear what of between two or more norms must be applied. This provokes the consequence of which the judge is the manager of finding the correct answer, or, to find a just answer that bears in mind the norm that must be considered, fulfilling the lagoons that the same one could provoke. The possibility that for every case a correct answer exists, has been one of the topics that more debate has provoked between the lawyers, since on having come to the discretional nature, it might understand that it gives place to several different decisions applicable to the same case depending on the interpreter entrusted to provide an answer, in whose case would be necessary to determine to begin if it is possible that more than one correct answer exists for the same case. To obtain an answer that, although optional, it is based on Right, the interpreter must come to the Juridical Beginning, which will be the norms entrusted to provide to the completitud Arranging. Due to the big grade of generality of the Beginning, it will be an arduous task to consider which of them must be applied, as in multitude of cases more than one Beginning they will be able to be invoked, in whose case the interpreter will have the work of determining the Beginning that must prevail over the others for the certain case. To guarantee this juridical safety, and to avoid the arbitrariness, it will be necessary to establish limits to the discretional nature of the interpreter. These limits materialize further on, and although they serve to defend the juridical safety, cannot prevent the judge making use of this discretional nature from creating Right, fact that has been criticized by numerous authors, since he supposes a failure of the separation of powers on having allowed the norms creation the judiciary by means of the interpretation. It is for it that these limits act, preventing the adopted decision from being able to reduce any of the rights of the individuals, forcing the judge to justify its decision as well as to indicate the adjustment of the same one to Right.
[EN]To today, it is undeniable that the judge enjoys of an undoubted and necessary discretional nature, as a result, between other factors, of the increasing resource to the Juridical Beginning in the contemporary constitutionalism. Nevertheless, although it is true that this discretional nature is inevitable, also the fact it is that it has to be controlled somehow to prevent from deriving in arbitrariness and supposing a threat by the beginning of equality and of juridical safety. Although formerly the judge was considered to be a mere applicator of the Right, who was limiting himself to reproducing the words of the law, to today this perspective is not shared for the most part, so in a society as complex as ours there are numerous the cases in which the interpreter turns out to be forced to fulfill the juridical lagoons that could happen, well for the ambiguity with which the applicable norm is written, well for not being clear what of between two or more norms must be applied. This provokes the consequence of which the judge is the manager of finding the correct answer, or, to find a just answer that bears in mind the norm that must be considered, fulfilling the lagoons that the same one could provoke. The possibility that for every case a correct answer exists, has been one of the topics that more debate has provoked between the lawyers, since on having come to the discretional nature, it might understand that it gives place to several different decisions applicable to the same case depending on the interpreter entrusted to provide an answer, in whose case would be necessary to determine to begin if it is possible that more than one correct answer exists for the same case. To obtain an answer that, although optional, it is based on Right, the interpreter must come to the Juridical Beginning, which will be the norms entrusted to provide to the completitud Arranging. Due to the big grade of generality of the Beginning, it will be an arduous task to consider which of them must be applied, as in multitude of cases more than one Beginning they will be able to be invoked, in whose case the interpreter will have the work of determining the Beginning that must prevail over the others for the certain case. To guarantee this juridical safety, and to avoid the arbitrariness, it will be necessary to establish limits to the discretional nature of the interpreter. These limits materialize further on, and although they serve to defend the juridical safety, cannot prevent the judge making use of this discretional nature from creating Right, fact that has been criticized by numerous authors, since he supposes a failure of the separation of powers on having allowed the norms creation the judiciary by means of the interpretation. It is for it that these limits act, preventing the adopted decision from being able to reduce any of the rights of the individuals, forcing the judge to justify its decision as well as to indicate the adjustment of the same one to Right.